Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240 (2006)

Authors
Anandi Hattiangadi
Stockholm University
Abstract
Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern of use can be described as 'correct'. For the antinaturalist argument to go forward, content must be prescriptive. I argue, however, that it is not. Moreover, the thesis that content supplies standards for correct use is insufficient to supply a similar, a priori objection to naturalism.
Keywords Content  Meaning  Metaphysics  Naturalism  Normativity  Semantics
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DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2006.00312.x
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.
The Normativity of Meaning Defended.Daniel Whiting - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):133-140.
The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?Daniel Whiting - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):535-555.

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