Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526 (2017)

Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs.
Keywords moods  emotion  intentionality  representationalism  philosophy of emotion
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9825-0
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The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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