Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.
Keywords emotion  intentionality  intentionalism  representationalism
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100007918
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
Phenomenal Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.
Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.

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Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-111.
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