Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):21-28 (1982)

Daniel Hausman
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Constructive empiricism, Bas van fraassen's new variety of anti-Realism, Maintains that science aims at empirically adequate, Rather than true theories and that, In fully accepting a theory, One should believe only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate just in case it has a model in which all observable phenomena may be embedded. I challenge van fraassen's main arguments and argue that the observable/unobservable distinction will not bear the weight that van fraassen places on it
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.1982.tb00083.x
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The Two Antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen.Andre Kukla - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):431-454.

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