Gödel's program revisited part I: The turn to phenomenology

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):529-590 (2006)
Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel's own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology
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DOI 10.2178/bsl/1164056807
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References found in this work BETA
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Husserl's Notion of Noema.Dagfinn Føllesdal - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (20):680-687.
Reason and Intuition.Charles Parsons - 2000 - Synthese 125 (3):299-315.
Elementary Embeddings and Infinitary Combinatorics.Kenneth Kunen - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (3):407-413.

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Gödel and Philosophical Idealism.Charles Parsons - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (2):166-192.
On What There is—Infinitesimals and the Nature of Numbers.Jens Erik Fenstad - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):57-79.

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