Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):325 – 331 (2007)

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Abstract
The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701342996
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
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Realism and Response-Dependence.P. Pettit - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):587-626.

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