How (not) to specify normal conditions for response-dependent concepts

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):325 – 331 (2007)
The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701342996
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References found in this work BETA
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Mark Johnston (1993). Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism. In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130.

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Eline Busck Gundersen (2011). The Chameleon's Revenge. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):435-441.

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