Manipulation and the causal Markov condition

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856 (2004)
This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
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DOI 10.1086/425235
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Correlational Data, Causal Hypotheses, and Validity.Federica Russo - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):85 - 107.
Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem and Provisional Solution.Markus I. Eronen & Daniel S. Brooks - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):185-202.

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