The Monist 94 (2):244-266 (2011)

Matthew Haug
College of William and Mary
In this paper, I investigate how different views about the vertical and horizontal structure of reality affect the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalism. This debate is commonly assumed to hinge on whether there are high-level, special-science properties that are distinct from low-level physical properties and whether the alleged multiple realizability of high-level properties establishes this. I defend a metaphysical interpretation of nonreductive physicalismin the absence of both of these assumptions. Adopting an independently motivated, discipline-relative account of natural properties and appealing to a phenomenon I call “multiple determinativity,” in which a single physical property simultaneously realizes different kinds of special-science properties, is sufficient to show that some special-science properties are irreducible to physical properties and that nonreductive physicalism is not merely a terminological variant of reductive physicalism.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist201194212
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,165
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Theorize About Multiple Realization.David Barrett - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):674-690.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Dependence.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-27.
Shoemaker on Emergence.Warren Shrader - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):285 - 300.
Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism.Todd Buras - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.


Added to PP index

Total views
111 ( #80,724 of 2,324,710 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #229,194 of 2,324,710 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes