Ordinary Devices: Reply to Bringsjord's `Clarifying the Logic of Anti-Computationalism: Reply to Hauser'1

Minds and Machines 10 (1):115-117 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX


What Robots Can and Can't Be (hereinafter Robots) is, as Selmer Bringsjord says "intended to be a collection of formal-arguments-that-border-on-proofs for the proposition that in all worlds, at all times, machines can't be minds" (Bringsjord, forthcoming). In his (1994) "Précis of What Robots Can and Can't Be" Bringsjord styles certain of these arguments as proceeding "repeatedly . . . through instantiations of" the "simple schema"



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reply to Bringsjord and Ferrucci.André Thayse - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):311-312.
Reply to Glymour and Thayse.Selmer Bringsjord & David A. Ferrucci - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):313-315.
John Searle, the mystery of consciousness.Selmer Bringsjord - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (3):457-459.


Added to PP

124 (#146,666)

6 months
11 (#243,798)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What Robots Can and Can’t Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1992 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Add more references