Personal identity and concern for the future

Philosophia 24 (3-4):481-492 (1995)
Abstract
Parfit's reductionist theory of personal identity states that a person's persistence through time is just a matter of psychological continuity and connectedness. He uses this theory to argue against the requirement of equal concern: the view that a rational person should be equally concerned about all parts of her future. The argument is that since psychological connectedness is one of grounds of a person's concern for her future and since connectedness is weaker over longer periods, it follows that a person can rationally care less about her more distant future. I argue that Parfit's argument fails because the principles it employs generate counterexamples. I conclude by showing that if Parfit's view is modified so as to avoid these counterexamples, his argument against the requirement dissolves
Keywords Future  Metaphysics  Morality  Personal Identity  Parfit, D
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379974
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