Rational belief and social interaction

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):163-164 (2003)
Abstract
Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that suggest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that improved models of belief are needed.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X03330055
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