Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330 (2010)

Authors
Matthew Haug
College of William and Mary
Abstract
Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996 ); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006 ); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007 ) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009 ). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive” and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility.
Keywords Realization  Determination  Determinable/determinate relation  Mechanism  Mind-body problem  Reduction
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9409-3
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References found in this work BETA

Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Social Construction: Big-G Grounding, Small-G Realization.Aaron Griffith - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):241-260.
Exclusion, Still Not Tracted.Douglas Keaton & Thomas W. Polger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):135-148.

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