Revealed preference, belief, and game theory

Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115 (2000)
Abstract
The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267100000158
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Statistical Decisions Under Ambiguity.Jörg Stoye - 2011 - Theory and Decision 70 (2):129-148.
Do Bets Reveal Beliefs?Jean Baccelli - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.

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