Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404 (2016)

Authors
Levi Spectre
Open University of Israel
John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
Daniel Rothschild
University College London
Abstract
It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience. If this is right, then you might think that the evidential warrant required for asserting a proposition is just the same as the warrant for believing it. We call this thesis entitlement equality. We argue here that entitlement equality is false, because our everyday notion of belief is unambiguously a weak one. Believing something is true, we argue, is compatible with having relatively little confidence in it. Asserting something requires something closer to complete confidence. Specifically, we argue that believing a proposition merely requires thinking it likely, but that thinking that a proposition is likely does not entitle one to assert it. This conclusion conflict with a standard view that ‘full belief’ is the central commonsense non-factive attitude
Keywords Credence  Epistemology  Assertion  Full belief  Neg-raising
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0553-7
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
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Citations of this work BETA

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint:1-34.

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