Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):396–405 (2005)
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| Abstract |
Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic
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| Keywords | Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| ISBN(s) | 0031-8205 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00534.x |
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References found in this work BETA
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
View all 8 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Will Done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy.Fabrizio Cariani & Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):129-165.
Levelling Counterfactual Scepticism.Katie Steele & Alexander Sandgren - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):927-947.
View all 66 citations / Add more citations
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