The Monist 87 (3):339-50 (2004)
We show that someone who believes in both gunk and the possibility of supertasks has to give up either a plausible principle about where gunk can be located, or plausible conservation principles
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science|
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