Degree-of-belief and degree-of-support: Why bayesians need both notions

Mind 114 (454):277-320 (2005)

Authors
James Hawthorne
University of Oklahoma
Abstract
I argue that Bayesians need two distinct notions of probability. We need the usual degree-of-belief notion that is central to the Bayesian account of rational decision. But Bayesians also need a separate notion of probability that represents the degree to which evidence supports hypotheses. Although degree-of-belief is well suited to the theory of rational decision, Bayesians have tried to apply it to the realm of hypothesis confirmation as well. This double duty leads to the problem of old evidence, a problem that, we will see, is much more extensive than usually recognized. I will argue that degree-of-support is distinct from degree-of-belief, that it is not just a kind of counterfactual degree-of-belief, and that it supplements degree-of-belief in a way that resolves the problems of old evidence and provides a richer account of the logic of scientific inference and belief.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzi277
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,940
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.
The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. pp. 49--74.
Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 491--506.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
170 ( #39,841 of 2,235,507 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #41,046 of 2,235,507 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature