Discussion: Re‐solving irrelevant conjunction with probabilistic independence

Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514 (2004)
Abstract
Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of irrelevant conjunction, and does so in a more general setting than past attempts. We will show how to simplify and improve upon Fitelson's solution.
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DOI 10.1086/423626
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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
Bayesian Measures of Confirmation From Scoring Rules.Steven J. van Enk - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):101-113.

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