Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):244–264 (2008)
Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on the idea of evaluative experience.
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References found in this work BETA
Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.
The Authority of Affect.Mark Johnston - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.
Citations of this work BETA
Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger.Paul Boswell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy.Avery Archer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-17.
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