Fission, fusion and intrinsic facts

Abstract
Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence
Keywords PERSONAL IDENTITY   HUMEAN SUPERVENIENCE   TEMPORAL PARTS   WORLDS   TIME
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00473.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,126
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Fission May Kill You.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.
Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
Persistence and Determination.Katherine Hawley - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Closest Continuer View Revisited.Marc Slors - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):387-402.
Supervenience and (Non-Modal) Reductionism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Time.J. M. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):793-810.
Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases?Alan Sidelle - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):415-430.
Humean Supervenience and Personal Identity.Ryan J. Wasserman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593.
Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence.Maureen Donnelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51.
Supervenience and Microphysics.Terence E. Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

130 ( #37,047 of 2,171,850 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #56,792 of 2,171,850 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums