Fission, fusion and intrinsic facts

Authors
Katherine Hawley
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence
Keywords PERSONAL IDENTITY   HUMEAN SUPERVENIENCE   TEMPORAL PARTS   WORLDS   TIME
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00473.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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Citations of this work BETA

Fission May Kill You.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.
Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
Persistence and Determination.Katherine Hawley - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:197-212.

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