How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens

In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275 (2010)
Abstract
The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts to resolve the paradox within a Bayesian framework, and show how to improve upon them. This part begins with a discussion of how probabilistic methods can help to clarify the statement of the paradox itself. And it describes some of the early responses to probabilistic explications. We then inspect the assumptions employed by traditional (canonical) Bayesian approaches to the paradox. These assumptions may appear to be overly strong. So, drawing on weaker assumptions, we formulate a new-and-improved Bayesian confirmation-theoretic resolution of the Paradox of the Ravens.
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Citations of this work BETA
“The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer.Roger Clarke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation Really Support Bayesianism?Brian Laetz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):39-46.

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