In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275 (2010)

Authors
Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
Abstract
The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts to resolve the paradox within a Bayesian framework, and show how to improve upon them. This part begins with a discussion of how probabilistic methods can help to clarify the statement of the paradox itself. And it describes some of the early responses to probabilistic explications. We then inspect the assumptions employed by traditional (canonical) Bayesian approaches to the paradox. These assumptions may appear to be overly strong. So, drawing on weaker assumptions, we formulate a new-and-improved Bayesian confirmation-theoretic resolution of the Paradox of the Ravens.
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
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Evidence.Victor DiFate - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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