Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590 (2008)
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| Abstract |
Judging by our folk appraisals, then, knowledge and action are intimately related. The theories of rational action with which we are familiar leave this unexplained. Moreover, discussions of knowledge are frequently silent about this connection. This is a shame, since if there is such a connection it would seem to constitute one of the most fundamental roles for knowledge. Our purpose in this paper is to rectify this lacuna, by exploring ways in which knowing something is related to rationally acting upon it, defending one particular proposal against anticipated objections.
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| Keywords | Knowledge-Action Principle interest-relative invariantism |
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| ISBN(s) | 0022-362X |
| DOI | 10.5840/jphil20081051022 |
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
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