Knowledge and Lotteries

Oxford University Press (2003)
Authors
John Hawthorne
University of Southern California
Abstract
Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a large fortune. After providing a number of specific and general characterizations of the puzzle, Hawthorne carefully examines the competing merits of candidate solutions. In so doing, he explores a number of central questions concerning the nature and importance of knowledge, including the relationship of knowledge to assertion and practical reasoning, the status of epistemic closure principles, the merits of various brands of scepticism, the prospects for a contextualist account of knowledge, and the potential for other sorts of salience-sensitive accounts. Along the way, he offers a careful treatment of pertinent issues at the foundations of semantics. His book will be of interest to anyone working in the field of epistemology, as well as to philosophers of language.
Keywords knowledge  practical reasoning  contextualism  pragmatic encroachment  epistemology
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Reprint years 2004, 2005
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Call number BD212.O46 2004
ISBN(s) 0199287139   0199269556   9780199269556   9780199287130  
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00072.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

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