Merricks on whether being conscious is intrinsic

Mind 107 (428):841-843 (1998)

Authors
Katherine Hawley
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
This is a short response to a paper by Trenton Merricks in which he argues against the following doctrine: Microphysical Supervenience (MS) Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn.
Keywords Consciousness  Intrinsic  Metaphysics  Supervenience  Merricks, T
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DOI 10.1093/mind/107.428.841
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Kind‐Dependent Grounding.Alex Moran - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):359-390.
Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
Maximality and Consciousness.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
Replies.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.

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