Mind 109 (434):285-298 (2000)
Abstractln "Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism" Teresa Robertson (1998) contends that the best-known arguments in favour of origin essentialism can succeed only at the cost of violating modal common sense—by denying that any variation in constitution or process of assembly is possible. Focusing on the (Kripke-style) arguments of Nathan Salmon and Graeme Forbes, Robertson shows that both founder in the face of sophisticated Ship of Theseus style considerations. While Robertson is right that neither of the arguments is compelling as formulated, each can be modified to fend off her particular counterexamples; these modifications do not differ in kind from those already needed to deal with ordinary Theseus cases, requiring only a further narrowing of the sufficiency clause from which the necessity of origins is derived.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
Essential Vs. Accidental Properties.Teresa Robertson & Philip Atkins - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Essential Properties and Individual Essences.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):65-77.
Abduction and Modality.Stephen Biggs - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Similar books and articles
Does the New Route Reach its Destination?Teresa Robertson & Graeme Forbes - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):367-374.
Sperm, Eggs and Hunks: Biological Origins and Identity. [REVIEW]Nic Damnjanovic - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (2):113-126.
Prevention, Independence, and Origin.Guy Rohrbaugh & Louis deRosset - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):375-386.
Rohrbaugh and deRosset on the Necessity of Origin.Sonia Roca-Royes & Ross Cameron - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):361-366.
Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism.Teresa Robertson - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):729-750.