Abstract

The argument from reason is the name given to a family of arguments against naturalism, materialism, or determinism, and often for theism or dualism. One version of the argument from reason is what Victor Reppert calls “the argument from the psychological relevance of logical laws,” or what I call “the argument from logical principles.” This argument has received little attention in the literature, despite being advanced by Victor Reppert, Karl Popper, and Thomas Nagel. The versions of it that exist are more outlines than fully-developed arguments. My aim in this thesis is to clarify the argument, especially with regard to what issues are at stake; to develop the argument beyond Popper and Reppert’s initial versions of it; and to evaluate it as an anti-materialist argument. I have isolated five key premises in the argument: the laws of logic are objectively real, the laws of logic are abstract entities, materialism entails that we cannot have knowledge of abstract entities, knowledge of logical principles is essential for justified rational inferences, and we have knowledge of logical principles. I break down each premise in detail, evaluating each in light of materialist responses. The goal of this thesis, then, is to fill in the gaps, so to speak, in an argument that merits more attention than it has received up until now.