The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030 (2017)
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Abstract

We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.

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Author Profiles

James Hawthorne
University of Oklahoma
Jon Williamson
University of Kent
Jürgen Landes
Università degli Studi di Milano

References found in this work

In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Two mistakes regarding the principal principle.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.

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