Van Inwagen’s modal skepticism

Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364 (2011)

Authors
Peter Hawke
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology.
Keywords Skepticism  Modality  Modal epistemology  Yablo  van Inwagen
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9520-5
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References found in this work BETA

Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.
Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
Modal Epistemology.Peter Van Inwagen - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1):67--84.
Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification.Heimir Geirsson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):279-304.
What is It Like to Be a Zombie?Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--400.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skeptical Theism.Timothy Perrine & Stephen Wykstra - 2017 - In Paul K. Moser & Chad Meister (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil. Cambridge University Press. pp. 85-107.
Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings.Thomas Atkinson - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):115-132.

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