Ethics 124 (3):507-542 (2014)

Authors
Jennifer Hawkins
Duke University
Abstract
Philosophers concerned with what would be good for a person sometimes consider a person’s past desires. Indeed, some theorists have argued by appeal to past desires that it is in the best interests of certain dementia patients to die. I reject this conclusion. I consider three different ways one might appeal to a person’s past desires in arguing for conclusions about the good of such patients, finding flaws with each. Of the views I reject, the most interesting one is the view that prudential value is, at least partly, concerned with the shape of a life as a whole
Keywords well-being  welfare  prospective autonomy  best interests  beneficence  dementia  surrogate decision-making  alzheimer's disease  cognitive disability  shape of a life
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DOI 10.1086/675365
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References found in this work BETA

Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
Well-Being as Enjoying the Good.Shelly Kagan - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):253-272.
Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.

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Citations of this work BETA

Theory Without Theories: Well-Being, Ethics and Medicine.Jennifer Hawkins - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
First Do No Harm: Euthanasia of Patients with Dementia in Belgium.Raphael Cohen-Almagor - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (1):74-89.

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