Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216 (1998)
Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic properties is misleading. For my more recent thoughts in this area, please see my 'David Lewis on Persistence' (2015).
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Enabling Relations As a Way to Transfer Causal Sufficiency.Manuel Liz Gutiérrez - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:87-93.
The Bundle Theory, the Principle of Unity for Elementary Particulars, and Some Issues.Andrew Newman - unknown
Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
Perceptual Objects May Have Nonphysical Properties.]ev Aaron Ben-Ze[hamza - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.
Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2011 - In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 143-159.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads117 ( #40,578 of 2,154,175 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #184,109 of 2,154,175 )
How can I increase my downloads?