Do we know how happy we are? On some limits of affective introspection and recall

Noûs 41 (3):394–428 (2007)
Abstract
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00653.x
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References found in this work BETA
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On Liberty and Other Essays.John Stuart Mill - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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Citations of this work BETA
Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility.Jason Marsh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466.
First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness.Anna Alexandrova - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.
Well‐Being and Philosophy of Science.Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):219-231.
Which Problem of Adaptation?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (4):474-492.

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