Do we know how happy we are? On some limits of affective introspection and recall

Noûs 41 (3):394–428 (2007)
Abstract
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00653.x
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References found in this work BETA
On Liberty and Other Essays.John Stuart Mill - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness.Anna Alexandrova - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.
Making Good Choices: Toward a Theory of Well-Being in Medicine.Alicia Hall - 2016 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37 (5):383-400.
Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility.Jason Marsh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466.

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Similar books and articles
Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Introspection and Consciousness.Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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