Philosophical Studies 146 (3):379 - 398 (2008)

Authors
Reina Hayaki
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
This paper examines the logic of fictions within fictions. I argue that consistently nested consistent fictions must have certain formal characteristics. The most important is that they form a tree structure. Depending on one’s theory of fictional objects, additional constraints may apply regarding the appearance of a fictional object in two or more fictional universes. The background motivation for the paper is to use iterated fiction operators as a tool for making sense of iterated modal operators; I conclude by noting briefly where the results about nested fictions can, and where they cannot, be extended to nested possible worlds.
Keywords Nested fictions  Fictional characters  Iterated modality  Possible worlds
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Reprint years 2009
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9272-7
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.

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Imagining Stories: Attitudes and Operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.

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