Authors
Reina Hayaki
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
The standard view of metaphysical necessity is that it is truth in all possible worlds, and therefore that the correct modal logic for metaphysical necessity is S5, in models of which all worlds are accessible from each other. I argue that S5 cannot be the correct logic for metaphysical necessity because accessibility is not symmetric: there are possible worlds that are accessible from ours but from which our world is not accessible. There are (or could be) some individuals who, if they had not existed, could not have existed. Once the possibility of such individuals is lost, it is gone forever.
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References found in this work BETA

Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity.Robert Merrihew Adams - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
The Logic of What Might Have Been.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.

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Citations of this work BETA

Fictions Within Fictions.Reina Hayaki - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):379 - 398.

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