A Counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor Account of Instantial Reasoning

Authors
Tristan Haze
University of Sydney
Abstract
In a recent paper, Breckenridge and Magidor argue for an interesting and counterintuitive account of instantial reasoning. According to this account, in arguments such as one beginning with 'There is some x such that x is mortal. Let O be such an x. ...', the 'O' refers to a particular object, although we cannot know which. I give and defend a simple counterexample involving the notion of an unreferred-to object.
Keywords instantial reasoning  arbitrary reference  semantics of logic  philosophy of logic  philosophy of language
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DOI 10.5840/jpr201691495
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References found in this work BETA

Arbitrary Reference.Wylie Breckenridge & Ofra Magidor - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):377-400.

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