A Note on Carnap’s Result and the Connectives

Axiomathes 29 (3):285-288 (2019)
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Carnap’s result about classical proof-theories not ruling out non-normal valuations of propositional logic formulae has seen renewed philosophical interest in recent years. In this note I contribute some considerations which may be helpful in its philosophical assessment. I suggest a vantage point from which to see the way in which classical proof-theories do, at least to a considerable extent, encode the meanings of the connectives (not by determining a range of admissible valuations, but in their own way), and I demonstrate a kind of converse to Carnap’s result.

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Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

How May the Propositional Calculus Represent?Tristan Haze - 2017 - South American Journal of Logic 3 (1):173-184.

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References found in this work

Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.
Formalization of Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1943 - Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press.

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