Grice's razor
Metaphilosophy 38 (5):669-690 (2007)
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| Abstract |
Grice’s Razor is a principle of parsimony which states a preference for linguistic explanations in terms of conversational implicature, to explanations in terms of semantic context-dependence. Here I propose a Gricean theory of knowledge attributions, and contend on the basis of Grice’s Razor that it is superior to contextualism about ‘knows’.
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| Keywords | knowledge contextualism conversational implicature |
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| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00512.x |
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