Grice's razor

Metaphilosophy 38 (5):669-690 (2007)
Abstract
Grice’s Razor is a principle of parsimony which states a preference for linguistic explanations in terms of conversational implicature, to explanations in terms of semantic context-dependence. Here I propose a Gricean theory of knowledge attributions, and contend on the basis of Grice’s Razor that it is superior to contextualism about ‘knows’.
Keywords knowledge  contextualism  conversational implicature
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00512.x
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References found in this work BETA
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pragmatic Contextualism.Geoff Pynn - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):26-51.
Knowledge Claims and Context: Belief.Wayne A. Davis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):399-432.
Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle.Wayne A. Davis - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.

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