How to defend response moralism

British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3):241-255 (2009)
Abstract
Here I defend response moralism, the view that some emotional responses to fi ctions are morally right, and others morally wrong, from the objection that responses to merely fi ctional characters and events cannot be morally evaluated. I defend the view that emotional responses to fi ctions can be morally evaluated only to the extent that said responses are responses to real people and events.
Keywords Ethical Criticism   Genre
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DOI 10.1093/aesthj/ayp020
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Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions.Shen-yi Liao - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):269-289.

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