Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility

Episteme 9 (3):205-223 (2012)
This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.
Keywords agnosticism  epistemic akrasia  higher-order doubts or evidence
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2012.11
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References found in this work BETA
David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Timothy Williamson (1996). Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Worsnip (2015). The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).

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Matthew Chrisman (2008). Ought to Believe. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Edward Hinchman (2012). Reflection, Disagreement, and Context. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
Tom Stoneham (1998). On Believing That I Am Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.

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