Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility

Episteme 9 (3):205-223 (2012)
This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.
Keywords agnosticism  epistemic akrasia  higher-order doubts or evidence
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2012.11
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher-Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Epistemology Futures.Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing and Asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Respecting All the Evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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