Quine’s Poor Tom

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):5-16 (2019)
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Abstract

Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.

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Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
University of Melbourne

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
A note on an argument of Quine's.R. C. Sleigh - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (6):91 - 93.
Epistemic opacity again.David Widerker - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.

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