Quine’s Poor Tom


Authors
Tristan Haze
University of Sydney
Abstract
Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.
Keywords Belief contexts  referential transparency  opacity  Quine  perspicuity
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. QUINE - 1960 - MIT Press.
A Note on an Argument of Quine's.R. C. Sleigh - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (6):91 - 93.
Epistemic Opacity Again.David Widerker - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.

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