Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness

There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief ’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while belief “aims” at truth, desire has no analogous “aim.” This paper defends the Aristotelian thesis
Keywords belief  desire  guise of the good
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