Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge

Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311 (2015)
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Abstract

I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).

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Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
University of Melbourne

References found in this work

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.

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