Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
University of Melbourne
In an influential passage of Naming and Necessity Kripke argues, with the help of a fictional dialogue, that de re metaphysical modal distinctions have intuitive content. In this note I clarify the workings of the argument, and what it does and does not support. I conclude that Kripke’s argument does not, despite possible appearances, support the view that metaphysical modal distinctions are made in common sense discourse. The argument does however support the view that if metaphysical modal distinctions make sense at the level of statements or states of affairs, then they also make sense de re.
Keywords de re modality  metaphysical modality  Kripke  common sense
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12185
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