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Assertion: New Philosophical Essays
Brown H. Cappelen, J. (ed.)
Oxford University Press (2010)
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Similar books and articles
Against Assertion.Herman Cappelen - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Epistemological contextualism and the knowledge account of assertion.Joseph Shieber - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.
The Early Wittgenstein on Logical Assertion.Ian Proops - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):121-144.
Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.
Assertion: New Philosophical Essays.Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work
Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
Iffy predictions and proper expectations.Matthew A. Benton & John Turri - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1857-1866.
Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity?Emma C. Gordon - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4955-4972.
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