How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic Program

Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-22 (2021)
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Abstract

This article proposes two interpretations of the concept of belief hierarchies in Bayesian game theory: the behaviorist interpretation and the mentalist interpretation. On the former, belief hierarchies are derived from the players’ preferences over acts. On the latter, they are causal mechanisms that are responsible for the players’ choices and preferences over acts. The claim is that the epistemic program in game theory is potentially confronted with a dilemma regarding which interpretation should be adopted. If the behaviorist interpretation of belief hierarchies is retained, then Bayesian game theory cannot account for the players’ reasoning that leads to the generation of specific belief hierarchies and thus to the implementation of a specific strategy profile in a game. If the mentalist interpretation is retained, then belief hierarchies appear to be unnecessarily and unrealistically complex objects and that as a result they fail to provide reasonable epistemic foundations for various solution concepts. In other words, neither interpretation seems to allow the epistemic program to fulfill all its aims. I suggest however that the mentalist interpretation can be arranged to escape this dilemma.

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Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.

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