Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism in this respect. Second, it explains why it seems that morality in fact couldn't have a source.
Keywords brute moral facts  reductionism in ethics  ethical non-naturalism  constructivism  moral realism  foundations of morality  divine command theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v6i2.62
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,827
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.
Grounding and Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):155-178.
Why Care About Moral Fixed Points?David Killoren - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):165-173.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-02-16

Total views
580 ( #11,129 of 2,432,743 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #46,608 of 2,432,743 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes