Could Morality Have a Source?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-19 (2012)
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Abstract

It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism in this respect. Second, it explains why it seems that morality in fact couldn't have a source.

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Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder

References found in this work

The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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