Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present a new argument against so-called fitting attitude analyses of intrinsic value, according to which, roughly, for something to be intrinsically good is for there to be reasons to want it for its own sake. The argument is indirect. First, I submit that advocates of a fitting-attitude analysis of value should, for the sake of theoretical unity, also endorse a fitting-attitude analysis of a closely related but distinct concept: the concept of intrinsic value for a person, i.e., the concept of welfare. Then I argue directly against fitting-attitude analyses of welfare. This argument, which is the focus of the paper, is based on the idea that whereas whether an event is good or bad for a person doesn’t change over time, the attitudes there is reason to have towards such an event can change over time. Therefore, one cannot explain the former in terms of the latter, as fitting-attitude analyses of welfare attempt to do.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,827
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Value in Ethics and Economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value and the Right Kind of Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
Value and Reasons to Favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
Value Theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobson - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Value and the Right Kind of Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
Value and Reasons to Favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory.Mark Alfano - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3):1-14.
Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting Problem.André Kukla - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):248-252.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
230 ( #40,813 of 2,432,761 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #97,111 of 2,432,761 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes