Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244 (2015)

Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not. I offer a partial, positive characterization of irreducible normativity in naturalistic terms. At a first pass, it is this: that to attribute a normative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing, due to the nature of the property attributed. This theory characterizes normativity in terms of the natural phenomenon of performing certain familiar speech acts. The hypothesis does other explanatory work as well: it provides for an account of the "queerness" of normative properties, one superior to other accounts; it explains why metaethical reductionism is bound to fail, in a way friendly to non-naturalism (as opposed to non-cognitivism); and it can help deflect arguments against non-naturalism from the "essential practicality" of normativity.
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

XV—Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority.Shamik Dasgupta - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):297-319.
A Dilemma for Non-Naturalists: Irrationality or Immorality?Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042.
Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017 (3):1-9.

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