On What Will Be: Reply to Westphal

Erkenntnis 67 (1):137-142 (2007)
Abstract
Jonathan Westphal's recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal's proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying. It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar, tensed truthmaking principle.
Keywords Westphal  Time  Temporal ontology  Eternalism  Truthmaking  future contingents
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9050-5
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and the Past.Michael Dummett - 2004 - Columbia University Press.
On Presentism and Triviality.Thomas Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.
Time.Ned Markosian - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA
Presentism and Truthmaking.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
Tensed Truthmaker Theory.Sam Baron - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):923-944.
Groundless Truth.Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2014 - Inquiry 57 (2):175-195.
Ostrich Presentism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.

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