Simulation and cognitive penetrability

Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67 (1996)
: Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation‐derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content
Keywords Cognition  Content  Epistemology  Simulation  Stich, S
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00028.x
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References found in this work BETA
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
Interpretation Psychologized.A. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.

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Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory.Theodore Bach - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.
Predictive Failure.Ian Ravenscroft - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (3):143-168.

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