Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority

Mind 122 (486):fzt052 (2013)

Jane Heal
Cambridge University
We are social primates, for whom language-mediated co-operative thinking (‘co-cognition’) is a central element of our shared life. Psychological concepts may be illuminated by appreciating their role in enriching and improving such co-cognition — a role which is importantly different from that of enabling detailed prediction and control of thoughts and behaviour. This account of the nature of psychological concepts (‘co-cognitivism’) has social anti-individualism about thought content as a natural corollary. The combination of co-cognitivism and anti-individualism further suggests that, in addition to the familiar first person authority with which we ascribe thoughts to ourselves, there may also be something deserving the name ‘second person authority’
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzt052
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References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
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Citations of this work BETA

The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections.Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1122-1145.
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Wittgensteinian Content‐Externalism.Ben Sorgiovanni - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
Second Person Thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.

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